Is getting the bad assets out of the banks the way to go?

Today Federal Reserve Bank of Boston President Eric Rosengren said about getting the bad assets off the banks' books that it is "desirable to move quickly". I believe even more strongly than that, that it is essential. And that the people and institutions responsible for helping the economy recover are making a strategic mistake if they don't move quickly on it. They may be working on this in the background, and may even be finding problems and making progress. If so, the mistake is then one of communication.

Rosengren's study of the Japanese banks experience points to getting the bad assets out as cucial.

Rosengren points out from almost an organizational studies point of view that while the bad assets are on a bank's books, management stays fixated on the losses and mistakes at the cost of not moving forward into new, good loans. And as a trader, I know that sitting around looking at losses is not helpful in finding and making the next profitable trade. Instead, one should analyze the bad trade, learn what can be learned, and forget about the pain of the loss and move forward.

Getting the bad assets out of the institutions is of course easier said than done. That doesn't affect at all whether doing so is crucial to recovery. As we see with the Citibank bailout effors to date, the sick assets essentially sicken the whole institution. I've listened to many commentators about this, especially over the last three months. And it seems to me that the smart ones are essentially in agreement that paths always lead back to the bad assets in the institutions and their value. Washington and others may want that fact to go away, but it won't.

Neither is the fact that the root cause of the creation of those bad assets was the government's driving the banks to make lousy loans they would not otherwise have made. But I've covered that particular point already in this blog.

Here's a list of issues I've seen regarding the bad assets. Specifically these assets are the CDO's containing subprime loans, and derivatives based on these and other troubled assets, including CDS's.

1) There are losses on derivatives created out of thin air. That is, not just derivatives based on CDO's that actually exist. For the best explanation I've seen of this, see the article "The End" in Portfolio magazine, Dec08/Jan09.

2) The question is how to value assets, and after determining what are they worth. Of course the simple answer is that they *should* be valued by price discovery in an open, regulated, undistorted market. Since that option is not available, some form of modeling must be used.

3) The "taxpayer" has an interest in this. Politicians of any skill at all learned quickly months ago to recite phrases like "protect the taxpayer", "make the investment back" for them, "protect their interest" and the like. Nice to consider, but our situation is so bad that there will just be costs. This situation seems to be worse than the savings and loan debacle, and its relatively successful bailouts. The models for valuing the assets become mechanisms for allocating the losses. Not pretty.

4) The FASB changed an accounting rule earlier in the crisis, known as "mark-to-market" and also "Fair Value Accounting". I feel I understand FASB's basic motivation to make the rule change. A huge theme in accounting is knowing the present value of everything, even things that won't be realized as a financial entry until the distant future. However, this rule change, accompanied by a lack of guidance at the time, did serious but quiet harm to banks and other institutions. This harm is not yet fully discovered. Over-the-counter, unregulated markets and the end of markets and price discovery at all combined with the rule to force banks losses. The get close to declaring the losses; they need the bailouts.

5) The "bad-bank" discussions are about creating containers for the toxic assets outside the instituions. If we had liquid markets for the assets, we wouldn't need the containers. Every few days there's a story about a firm that wants to buy some toxic assets, but learn that they can't. In a sense it's too dangerous to establish a price by selling assets to them. Go figure.

6) In the end, leaving the toxic assets in a fully public "bad bank" wouldn't be as bad as the government nationalizing banks, or almost so. Why? The government can boss the assets around all it wants to, and then sell them later. This will cause less long-term damage to markets and American free enterprise then the government bossing around banks, and creating long-term, heinous market distortions.

What’s the root cause of the sub-prime and credit debacle?

In the present housing and credit market problem sets, there has been limited commentary about the root causes and in my view over half of it has been completely distorted. The problem’s root cause is a market distortion caused by the government encouraging the residential real estate industry to get a higher percentage of Americans into home ownership. I recall reading about President Carter’s CRA and later about the ramp-up of this initiative in the 1990s. By 1996 this had resulted in President Clinton’s “National Partners in Homeownership” initiative, and a dramatic strengthening of the CRA.

How would this have worked if viewed from a market perspective? If the residential real estate market was generally at equilibrium before the government started this initiative, then who was there to find to increase the percentage of home ownership? Less credit-worthy borrowers was the only place to look. There was almost certainly not a meaningful percentage of Americans who could easily qualify to buy a house who had chosen instead to rent out of ignorance. The “secret” of the advantages of homeownership was pretty well out by the 1990’s. While financial education and increasing prosperity resulting in more homeownership are laudable goals, I lay root responsibility for the housing debacle on the government. And this is before any discussions of mortgage lending regulations and Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, and cross-incentives at work between those GSEs and members of Congress.

Others have pointed to Wall Street executives’ and firms’ greed as the root cause. They created the loan instruments and derivatives and sold them. Also blamed are the bankers and brokers who originated the loans. Certainly there was some greed and some money made. But before you can conclude that these parties were the root cause, you must first ask yourself: Are bankers idiots? They most certainly are not. They may not be into charity, but they're not idiots. In undistorted markets they act with meticulously calculated self-interest. They make their profits in a world enumerated in Basis Points, which are 1/100^th (one-one-hundredth) of a percent. So you must ask, what made them start making loans that were idiotic by banker's historical credit standards? And the answer is the incentives and controls in the CRA ratings. And, as has been explored elsewhere, no less than four regulating agencies provided the teeth and force that backed up the CRA and its bank rating system.

As the finger-pointing continues over our present problems there are plenty of parties to take the blame. The mortgage industry got creative and sold loans to people who shouldn’t have taken them. Home builders make money by building and selling homes, and were happy to fuel the boom. Realtors and real estate commentators fed the frenzy. Buyers can be excused for financial ignorance only so far. The housing market expansion took on a life of its own. We couldn’t have expected a mortgage lender or broker to be happy reporting lower sales numbers in the middle of a boom, even when the supply of reasonable marginal borrowers was getting thin. But I return to the idea that the original instigation was a market distortion started by the government. The initiative to raise the percentage of American homeowners was good as a starting concept, but very harmful when it devolved into putting unqualified buyers into homes who couldn’t afford them in the long term. And we all can see that now.

Lastly, one thing that surprised, amused, and saddened me was the Democratic campaign’s success in painting Republicans and free-market advocates as the root cause of the debacle. If I had run the Democratic campaign, I’d have pursued the same strategy. But if I had run the Republican campaign, I’d have not let that one go. I’d have made a tremendous amount of noise about the history and issues as they are laid out here. I was surprised to hear John McCain attack Wall Street over the issue instead.

Please read my first post below. That's where I lay out the basic free-market vs. Socialism logic.